The University of Sydney logo (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
I was told via the grapevine that a first year law student at the Sydney Law School, University of Sydney, that the students should not bother thinking about Justice, but that the courts were looking for a doctrine of completeness.
This is absolutely amazing that a university would admit there there is no justice in Australia.
Queensland University of Technology (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Certainly when I went to QUT Law School, Dr Elizabeth Dickson, a Senior Lecturer, did admit to me when I asked her an innocent enough question about where would it indicate on a published decision whether or not there was a jury, she proudly said with derision that “… we don’t have juries in Queensland“.
There are no juries, except in big criminal cases, which are really just for show to try to dupe the public into believing that we still have justice here in Australia.
What does the word “completeness” mean in relation to the law? Well, the word is not in the 1st Edition of Blacks Law Dictionary, and it’s not in Butterworths Australian Law Dictionary. My case (which you can read more about here), and my friends case were dealt with in line with the doctrine of “completeness”.
The word COMPLETENESS is a nasty word and when you read the meaning below, you’ll understand the dire implications on the false belief we have in democracy, and is confirmation that Australian courts are communist in nature and function.
Under Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, when part of a writing or recorded statement is introduced, an adverse party may require introduction of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with the writing or recorded statement originally introduced. This additional evidence is called explanatory evidence, and its purpose is to qualify, explain or put in context the original piece of introduced evidence. The explanatory writing does not have to be part of same writing or recording. Additionally, even otherwise inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay, can be admissible under this rule if it is necessary to correct any confusion or wrongful impression created by the admission of the original evidence.
Also found in: Dictionary/thesaurus, Medical, Financial, Encyclopedia, Wikipedia, 0.01 sec. See: conclusion, entirety, fait accompli, finality, …
Doctrine of Optional Completeness is an evidentiary rule providing that when a party introduces part of writing or an utterance at trial, the opposing party may require that the remainder of the passage be read to establish the full context. However no irrelevant utterances can be received under this rule. Further, the remainder of the utterance must explain the first part. In many jurisdictions, the rule applies to conversations, to an opponent’s admissions, to confessions, and to all other types of writings. However under federal law it is limited to writings or recorded statements. The following is an example of a Federal Statute on the topic: USCS Fed Rules Evid R 106: Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements. When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.
Jul 30, 2006 – Introduction At some point in the introductory class in contract law, students are likely to encounter a very powerful idea–the distinction between “default rules” and “mandatory rules.” The basic distinction is easy to grasp. Some rules of contract law supply default terms that are subject to contractual override; other rules of contract law are mandatory–they can’t be modified by the contract. Lurking in the background of this distinction is a theoretical construct–the complete contract, an idealized contract that would include explicit terms covering every possible contingency. Once you understand the distinction between default rules and mandatory rules, additional questions arise: as a matter of normative contract theory, which rules should be default rules and which rules should be mandatory? And what normative principles should guide the design of default rules?
Here’s an example. The Uniform Commercial Code (or UCC, the codified law of contract that applies to contracts between businesses as a matter of state law in the United States) creates a duty to act in good faith–this is a mandatory rule, because this duty cannot be disclaimed by a contractual provision. The UCC also includes an implied “warranty of merchantability,” that attaches to contracts, but can be waived by agreement–this is a default rule.
Grasping this distinction is important for at least two reasons. First, unless you know whether a given rule of contract law is a default rule or a mandatory rule, you don’t really know the law. And it isn’t always clear whether a given rule is one or the other: the usual tip-off is language like, “unless the contract provides otherwise” or “absent an agreement to the contrary.” Second, the distinction between default rules and mandatory rules is fundamental to the normative structure of contract law. Learning contract is more than a matter of mastering the rules; mastering the arguments of principle and policy that can be used to argue for and against the rules is equally important. But the arguments for default rules and the arguments for mandatory rules must be different–because these two kinds of rules have different functions.
Similarly, we can imagine a “complete code” that covers every possible action or inaction and specifies what legal consequences follow. Given that actual codes are incomplete, we can look at the law of statutory interpretation as including a collection of “default rules” that allow courts to fill in the gaps. Another example is provided by corporations law–once again, some of the rules are mandatory and others are merely defaults.
Once we understand the distinction between default rules and mandatory rules, we can then ask the question, “What normative principles should guide the design of default rules?” Another interesting question is why the law provides default rules at all. Why don’t we force the parties to reach complete agreements?
Now that we have the basic distinction between default and mandatory rules in mind, let’s discuss the related idea of a complete contract. Once again, the core intuitive idea is relatively simple–a complete contract has provisions that cover “every contingency.” In other words, a complete contract has no gaps.
Why did I put “every contingency” in scare quotes? Because “every contingency” is an ambiguous way of formulating a fairly complex idea. Economists tend to use the phrase “states of affairs” to express the idea of a contingency. A “state of affairs” is simply a way that the world can be–a complete specification of the way things are. Philosophers use different jargon–the phrase “possible world” expresses the same idea as “state of affairs.”
So a truly “complete” contract would be a contract that specified the duties and rights of the parties for all the future states of the world–or all the possible worlds that share the history of the actual world up to the point the contract is formed. Once you think about it, it becomes clear that no actual contract could be complete. There are infinitely many possible future states of the world–and a contract that covered all of them would have an infinite number of provisions, and hence the drafting of such a contract would never be complete–it would still be unfinished when the universe reached a state of complete entropy.So the notion of a complete contract is an idealization–not a practical option. And once we see this point, another point becomes obvious. Contract law cannot provide default rules to cover every possible contingency either.
Just as the idea of a default rule can be generalized beyond contract law, so can the idea of completeness. One particularly important idealization is the idea of a “complete code”–a legal code that itself has provisions that cover every possible contingency. The complete code will have default rules or mandatory rules that for every possible future state of affairs.
Legal Completeness is a property that declares enterprise policies to cover all scenarios included or suggested by the law. Completeness suggests that there are no scenarios covered by the law that cannot be implemented in the enterprise. In addition, it implies that all scenarios not allowed by the law are not allowed by the enterprise. Enterprise policies are said to be legally complete if they contain no gaps in the legal sense. Completeness can be thought of in two ways: Some scholars make use of a concept of ‘obligational’ completeness such as Ayres and Gertner. According to this usage, a system or a contract is ‘obligationally’ complete if it specifies what each party is to do in every situation, even if this is not the optimal action to take under some circumstances. Others discuss ‘enforceability’ completeness in the sense that failing to specify key terms can lead a court to characterize a system as being too uncertain to enforce (May & Butcher v the King 1934), and hence a system may be complete with respect to enforceability. This leads to the following definition: enterprise regulations or requirements are legally complete if it specifies what each party is to do in each situation while covering all gaps in the legal sense
Jan 10, 2007 – Law of Completeness – definitions, examples and references from RealInnovation.com.
This law states that an autonomous technological system must include four minimally functioning principal parts: an engine, a transmission, a working means and a control means.
research.lawyers.com › Understand Your Legal Issue › Legal Dictionary
A rule permitting a party to require introduction of the rest of or more of a document or recorded statement that is being used as evidence by the opposing party. The rule of completeness applies when fairness demands consideration of the part of a document left out at the same time as the part that has been introduced.